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BUDGETARY AND PROGRAMMATIC FLUCTUATIONS DURING 
THE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION PHASE: 







Congress and Department of Defense continue their yearly quest to fund the 
National Defense Acquisition Strategy with a defense budget that finds itself spread 
across more military acquisition programs and competing with the redirection of funds 
supporting supplemental requirements including increased national security and the 
military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Compounding these external funding issues 
are a multitude of defense acquisition programs that continue to experience internal 
program cost overruns.  Most major defense acquisition programs take well over ten 
years to reach full-rate production.  These programs exceed long-term projected costs 
because initial developmental and procurement costs are estimated for only short-term 
accuracy.  This case study investigates the fluctuations in the reported budgetary 
projections and selected acquisition reported costs during the System Development and 
Demonstration Phase of the Marine Corps H-1 Upgrade Program, while cross-referencing 
potential programmatic causes for cost overruns.  The purpose of this case study is to 
research a major defense acquisition program, which has experienced a program 
acquisition unit cost breach, and explore the distribution of the cost increases of the 
internal and external developmental variables associated with reporting long-term cost of 
defense acquisition procurements.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
This MBA Project Report was cultivated out of a desire to integrate an interest in 
the Marine Corps H-1 helicopter community and the required completion of a student-
centered research project.  An incremental pyramid approach was applied as this project 
evolved out of the application of knowledge and skills learned in courses studied over the 
past 18 months.  To understand the pyramid approach, visualize the wealth of knowledge 
and data associated with any major defense acquisition program in the shape of a 
pyramid. The initial research, the base of the pyramid, exposes one to all topics and issue 
of a program.  As the academic curriculum progresses, each quarter allows the movement 
up a level of the pyramid were knowledge and further understanding focuses the student.  
Through the assistance of Faculty Advisors, the student reaches the top of the pyramid 









All courses provided the educational knowledge to complete this project, three 
specific courses (1) Principles of Acquisition and Program Management, (2) Defense 
Budget and Financial Management Policy, and (3) Defense Systems Contracting 
provided the opportunity to write and expand on a term paper revolving around the H-1 
Program.  The continuous informational research, collection, and analysis of data 
provided a learning process documented in this case study.  As this project required a 
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great deal of refinement, what may not be evident from this case study is the amount of 
knowledge and exposure to additional relevant topics, such as Acquisition Reform, 
Governmental Policy, and Cost Account Practices, that complemented, shaped and 
expanded the overall core learning experience of this MBA Project. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
How have the H-1 Upgrade Program costs increases changed since the 2001-2002 
Nunn-McCurdy Breach? 
2. Secondary Questions 
a. What are the background and history of the H-1 helicopter and H-1 
Upgrade Program? 
b. How does recent acquisition reform of the Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds 
affected the H-1 Upgrade Program? 
c. How do the cost variance categories contribute independently and 
collectively to the overall program cost increases during the EMD/SDD 
Phase?  
d. Has the H-1 Upgrade Program cost increases stabilized? 
e. Do program Selected Acquisition Reported Data and the President’s 
Budgeted Data reconcile?  
C. SCOPE 
In May 2007, contact was made with the Program Manager of the H-1 Upgrade 
Program and without hesitation; the Program Manager opened the doors of the program. 
In his exact words,”…to assist in shaping my research efforts into a meaning contribution 
for the program and quality learning experience for you.”  Direct Authorization and 
permission to assist was given immediately to his most senior staff.  Over the months, 
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phone calls, emails and information was exchanged; each person who assisted treated me 
as though I was part of the team.  Never once were my inquires turned away or left 
unanswered.   
Interest in the program gravitated to cost issues associated with major defense 
acquisition programs.  After a lengthy conference call, with the program Cost Analyst, 
the decision was to focus the analysis on, publicly accessible, Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SAR) and Comptroller data (President’s Budget).  Without the assistance and 
guidance of both the Cost and Earned Value Management (EVM) Analysts, weeks would 
have been spent learning and reviewing CPR data, only to discover the analysis beyond 
the available timeline or scope of this paper.  Though this case study may not provide the 
“meaningful contribution” I had hope to give back to the program, it is because of the 
patience and willingness of all whom I have contacted in the program office that this 
paper has been the culminating learning experience for me.  Please see the 
acknowledgements for all who assisted in focusing and refining the scope of this case 
study.  
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides an overview of the H-1 helicopter mission need statement, 
historical background of the H-1’s integration into the Marine Corps, the operational 
requirements and technical characteristics addressed in the upgrade, and briefly discusses 
the contractual developments and adjustments which occurred during the ten year 
timeline. 
Chapter III reviews the Defense Acquisition System Management Framework, the 
Defense Acquisition Program Life Cycle Management Framework, the Nunn-McCurdy 
Amendment of 1982, and those reporting requirements publicly accessible. 
Chapter IV reports the Comptroller Data, Selected Acquisition Report Summary 
Data, reviews the overall analysis and provides comparison of the data from all sources. 
Finally, Chapter V offers conclusions to the primary and secondary research 
questions, closing comments and recommendations offered for further research. 
  4
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II. H-1 UPGRADE HISTORY 
A. MISSION NEED 
“The mission of the AH-1W attack helicopter is to provide rotary wing close air 
support, anti-armor, armed escort, armed/visual reconnaissance and fire support 
coordination capabilities under day/night and adverse weather conditions.  The mission of 
the UH-1N utility helicopter is to provide command and control and combat assault 
support under day/night and adverse weather conditions and special operations support; 
supporting arms coordination and aeromedical evacuation.”1  A prime contract and sole 
source to Bell Helicopter Textron Inc, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) H-1 
Upgrade Program is a Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program encompassing the 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development of new end-items prior to a production 
approval decision.2  
B. HISTORY 
The H-1 program traces back to the late 1950s supporting the US Army’s air-
mobility concept in Vietnam.  Originally named “Iroquois” and designated the HU-1 (for 
Helicopter, Utility), the term Huey comes from this earlier designation.3  In 1962, under 
the new tri-service designation system the HU-1 became the H-1.  The utility helicopter 
entered service in 1956 and developed by Bell Helicopter for the US Army.  The Army’s 
Aviation Section of the Surgeon General’s Office set forth the chief design specification 
for the utility H-1.  This design carried at least four litter cases for the evacuation of 
wounded troops.4  A few additional requirements were… troop transport, equipment and 
                                                 
1  Department of the Navy, “FY 2007 President’s Budget,” Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 
Budget Navy Budget Activity 5, Line Item 93, p.1. 
2  Department of the Navy, “FY 2004 President’s Budget,” Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 
Budget Navy Budget Activity 5, Line Item 98, p. 6. 
3 H-1 Upgrade Program Website, “History,” http://pma276public.navair.navy.mil/pma276public/ 
history .asp (accessed March 2007). 
4 Ibid. 
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supplies, construction and design to permit field maintenance and be transportable via 
cargo airplane.”5  The first H-1 gunship was an armed Huey (UH-1B series) outfitted by 
the Army with the M-60 machine gun in the door launching the H-1 into combat 
operations escort.  
As early as 1962, the UH-1E was to become the next generation assault support 
helicopter for the Marine Corps.  Bell constructed the UH-1E.  “The Marines also 
operated armed Hueys in Vietnam, and ordered their own version of the Cobra in May 
1968.  Featuring the Pratt and Whitney Twinpac T400 engine (two 900-hp turbo shaft 
engines coupled together) giving an overall increase in installed power, the AH-1J Sea 
Cobra included a new nose turret gun, the three barrel XM-197 20mm and other 
improvements. While development and production of the first 49 ordered were under 
way, the Marines obtained 38 AH-1Gs from the Army. After initial training of Marines 
by the Army, Marine Huey Cobras first became operational in April 1969 with VMO-2 in 
Vietnam.  In December 1969, the AH-1Gs transferred to HML-367.  After flight tests 
beginning that same month and subsequent BIS trials, the first AH-1Js joined them in 
February 1971, entering combat the following month.  AH-1Js, including those of HMA-
369, participated in SE Asia operations until final withdrawal and continued as the 
Marine's attack helicopter afterwards, a total of 67 being delivered.”6  The last UH-1N 
came off the assembly line in 1979, while Bell tuned out the last AH-1W in 1998.7 
C. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
All operational, maintenance or reliability areas of these aircraft improved 
dramatically.  The following is a list of specific improvements when comparing 
remanufactured models of both H-1s under the H-1 Upgrade Program: 
 
                                                 
5 H-1 Upgrade Program Website, “History,” http://pma276public.navair.navy.mil/pma276public/ 
history .asp (accessed March 2007). 
6 Fox Company Vietnam 1963 to 1969 Website, http://www.foxco-2ndbn-9thmarines.com/ 
choppers.htm (accessed March 2007). 
7 Frank Wolfe, “Bell AH-1Z On Schedule For First Flight In October 2000,” Defense Daily, Aug 9, 
1999, Volume 203, Issue 27, p. 1. 
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Table 1.   Cobra Improvement Comparison 
Cobra  
Comparison 8 AH-1W AH-1Z 
Improvement 
[percent] 
Max Gross Weight 14,750 lbs 18,500 lbs 25 
Max. Internal Fuel 2,100 lbs 2,768 lbs 32 
Maximum speed 190 kts 222 kts 17 
Cruise speed 131 kts 142 kts 8 
Service ceiling 14,700 feet 20,000 feet 36 
Mission Radius 58 nm 128 nm 121 
      
Table 2.   Huey Improvement Comparison 
Huey  
Comparison 8 UH-1N UH-1Y 
Improvement 
[percent] 
Max Gross Weight 10,500 lbs 18,500 lbs 76 
Max. Internal Fuel 1,360 lbs 2,584 lbs 90 
Maximum speed 130 kts 198 kts 52 
Cruise speed 107 kts 153 kts 43 
HOGE Useful Load 3,532 lbs 5,930 lbs 68 
Service ceiling 17,300 feet 20,000 feet 16 
Mission Radius N/A 125 nm N/A 
   
 
Two main operational requirements of the upgrade program were to provide 
significant enhancement of the combat effectiveness and survivability of each type/model 
aircraft.  “Effectiveness will be improved with the new cockpit and integrated avionics 
systems, increased weapons quantities and accuracy, and improved speed, range, and 
payload capabilities (see comparison charts above).  Survivability is enhanced through 
                                                 
8  H-1 Upgrade Program Website (2007), http://pma276public.navair.navy.mil/pma276public/ 
program.asp#_Toc81179683. 
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ballistic hardening, redundant systems, damage tolerant materials and design, extensive 
explosion/fire protection, signature reduction, and improved electronic 
countermeasures.”9 
D. TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Major modifications for both aircraft that remanufacture AH-1W/UH-1N’s into 
AH-1Z/UH-1Y’s include:  a new 4-bladed, composite rotor system with semi-automatic 
blade fold, new performance matched transmissions, T700 Engine Digital Electronic 
Control Units (DECUs), new 4-bladed tail rotors and drive systems, more effective 
stabilizers, upgraded landing gear, tail pylon structural modifications, and common, fully 
integrated cockpits and avionics systems.  
This remanufacture will add 10,000 flight hours to AH-1Z/UH-1Y 
airframes.  The fully integrated cockpits will reduce operator workload 
and improve situational awareness, thus increasing safety and reducing the 
rate of aircraft attrition.  They will provide considerable growth potential 
for future weapon systems and avionics, which will significantly increase 
mission effectiveness and survivability.  The cockpits will also include 
integration of onboard mission planning, communications, digital fire 
control, self-navigation, night navigation/target in and weapon systems 
management in nearly identical crew stations, which significantly reduces 
training requirements.  This remanufacture maximizes commonality 
between the two aircraft and provides needed improvements in crew and 
passenger survivability, payload, power available, endurance, range, 
airspeed, maneuverability and supportability.10  
Having 84 percent AH-1Z/ UH-1Y identicality in maintenance-related 
components provides these operational and fiscal benefits (1) makes shipboard 
deployment easier and less spares to store on board (2) smaller strategic lift footprint, (3) 
increased readiness Lower Life Cycle Costs.11  Below is a list of all the common 
components 
                                                 
9  H-1 Upgrade Program Website (2007), http://pma276public.navair.navy.mil/ 
pma276public/program.asp. 
10  Department of the Navy, “FY 2007 President’s Budget,” Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation Budget Navy Budget Activity 5, Line Item 93, p. 1. 
11  H-1 Upgrade Program Website (2007), http://pma276public.navair.navy.mil/pma276public 
/program.asp. 
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Table 3.   Common Components 12 
Common Components 
T700-GE-401 engine Main rotor system 
Main rotor folding provisions Tail rotor system 
Flight control actuators Complete drive system 
Gearbox oil cooling Auxiliary power unit 
Engine exhaust IR suppressors Tailboom 
Hydraulic components Selected electrical components 
Integrated avionics system (IAS) 
components 
Engine and APU compartment fire 
detection and suppression 
 
One of the most interesting additions to both H-1 systems is a two-piece helmet 
called the Top Owl intended to help reduce pilot workload in the cockpit for tracking, 
aiming, and cueing weapons and other onboard systems.  The Top Owl currently used in 
the attack helicopters in Europe and South Africa, featuring fourth generation Night 
Vision Digital (NVD) technology, visor displaying of night vision imaging and Heads Up 
Display (HUD) data.13 
E. CONTRACTUAL ADJUSTMENTS 
In 1996, Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. and the US Navy were in the mists of 
completing negotiations for an Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) 
contract for the upgrade of 280 H-1 helicopters of the Marine Corps inventory.14  Under a 
one-year study contract, Bell would define the upgrade program that would address the 
four-blade rotor system, engines, drive trains, hydraulic systems, avionics and cockpit 
features.15  By 1998, Bell had completed 40 percent of the design phase having chosen 
                                                 
12  H-1 Upgrade Program Website (2007), http://pma276public.navair.navy.mil/pma276public 
/history.asp.
13  Ibid., program.asp, 
14  William B. Scott, “Bell to Upgrade Marine Corps Super Cobra, Twin Hueys,” Aviation Week & 
Space Technology, August 19, 1996. Volume 145, Issue 8, p. 72. 
15 Ibid. 
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General Electric to manufacture the engines (and transmissions) and Lucas Aerospace to 
supply the driveshaft.16  The plan called for the modifications of three AH-1W’s and two 
UH-1N’s for flight testing and evaluation by Marine Corps pilots.17  Lockheed Martin 
was awarded the contract from Bell to build the Target Sight System during the summer 
of 1998.18 
Of the five flight test aircraft built and delivered to the integrated test team in 
Patuxent River, AH-1Z #1 is used for envelope expansion, handling qualities, and 
structural flight demonstrations while upon completion of EMD testing will be used as a 
Live Fire Test and Evaluation aircraft.19  The four aircraft remaining, two UH-1Ys and 
two AH-1Zs, will be flown in support of the test program through Operational Evaluation 
(OPEVAL) and will be converted to maintenance trainers upon completion of testing.20 
In mid-October 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board authorized the first Low 
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase to remanufacture six UH-1Ns and three AH-1Ws at 
a cost of about $202 million surpassing a huge milestone transitioning the H-1 Upgrade 
Program from the developmental phase to production phase.21   
On 15 April 2005, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, 
technology and logistics, signed the Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
(ADM) that would provide ‘new-built’ UH-1Y’s to the Marine Corps fleet 
starting in 2008 as part of the third lot LRIP aircraft.  Due to the increase 
operational tempo coupled with the average age and attrition rate, as well 
as the marginal cost difference between new-build and remanufacturing, it 
                                                 
16 Edward H. Phillips, “Marine Corps H-1 Upgrade on Track,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
New York: May 4, 1998.  Volume 148, Issue 18, p. 47. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Frank Wolfe, “Joint Staff Endorses New Targeting System For AH-1Z,” Defense Daily, Nov 12, 
1998.  Vol. 200, Issue 58, p. 1. 
19 H-1 Upgrade Program Website (2007), http://pma276public.navair.navy.mil/pma276public 
/program.asp. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Defense Daily, “DAB Gives H-1 Upgrade Program For Marine Corps Green Light To Begin 
LRIP,” Oct 27, 2003.  Volume 219, Issue 18, p. 1. 
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had been concluded that building the UH-1Y from the ground up better 
supported the needs of the Marine Corps.22 
In July of 2005, Bell Helicopter Textron received the Naval Air Systems 
Command $104.2 million price/contract modification to the previously firm-fixed price 
contract that was awarded to fund the LRIP Lot II H-1 upgrade procurement.23 
In April 2006, a contracting officer at Naval Air System Command, wrote to Bell 
Helicopter Textron Inc., disturbed that two independent reviews had concluded there 
were multiple areas of concern, one being whether Bell could perform to the contract and 
deliver the H-1 on schedule and whether the program could go forward in accordance 
with the Bell Price Commitment letter of January 2006.24   The Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB) review of the H-1 Upgrade Program determined that the overall 
performance of Bell-Textron had improved.  The Navy scheduled another DAB in 
October 2006 to review both Bell’s and the program’s performance.  At this review, Bell 
would present a recommendation to meet the Marine Corps’ Light/Attack helicopter 
requirements and present a risk management plan to Department of Defense (DoD).25  In 
the third week of July 2006, the H-1 Upgrade Program surpassed another significant 
milestone; the Navy signed a $137 million contract for the first seven Lot 3 Bell 
Helicopter Textron UH-1Y helicopters as well as a full flight simulator and 
maintenance/training.26 
                                                 
22 Navy Newsstand: NAVAIR Bulletin Board , “UH-1Ys to be built new starting in 06,” Story 
Number: navair050422-02, April 22, 2005, downloaded http://www.navy.mil/search/print_bbs.asp? 
bbs_id=1332. 
23 UNITED STATES Overhaul & Maintenance.  Washington: Jul 1, 2005.  Vol. 11, Issue. 6,  p. 94.  
24 Defense Daily, “H-1 Upgrade Program To Press Forward, But Navy Could Consider 
Alternatives,” Potomac: Jun 27, 2006.  Vol. 230, Issue 61, p. 1. 
25 Defense Daily, “Navy to Award LRIP III for H-1 Upgrade, Will Keep Close Watch of Bell's 
Efforts,” Potomac: Jun 28, 2006.  Volume 230, Issue 61, p. 1. 
26 Defense Daily, “Navy Awards Bell $137 Million Contract For First Seven UH-1Y Helicopters,” 
Potomac: Jul 25, 2006.  Volume 231, Issue 14, p. 1. 
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III. MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS RESEARCH 
A systematic, pyramid approach applied to the research methodology helped to 
grasp the complex nature of major defense acquisition programs.  The following four 
topics provided an incremental understanding of defense acquisitions. They represent the 
external and internal variables that influence the defense acquisition process and the 
determination of cost overruns.  The first topic, the Defense Acquisition System 
Management Framework, provided the basic foundational knowledge.  Second, the 
Defense Acquisition Program Life-Cycle Management Framework converge of the 
research on the System Development Demonstration Phase.  Third, the Nunn-McCurdy 
Amendment of 1982 defines the purpose, categories, and thresholds of cost overruns.  
Finally, the reporting requirements supplied the hard data to facilitate answering the 
primary and secondary research questions. 
A. DEFENSE ACQUISITION “SYSTEM” MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
In constructing a solid knowledge base, initial research began by dealing with the 
process or system as a whole.  The DoD Directive 5000.1 provides the following 
overview as a basic understanding of the DoD acquisition system policy.27   
The Defense Acquisition System exists to manage the nation’s 
investments in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to 
achieve the National Security Strategy and support the United States 
Armed Forces.  The investment strategy of the DoD shall be postured to 
support not only today’s force, but also the next force, and future forces 
beyond that.  The primary objective of defense acquisition is to acquire 
quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to 
mission capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a 
fair and reasonable price. 
One of the more popular teaching tools is to apply the “Systems Framework” to 
the defense acquisition process.  Many journals or books utilize similar teaching aids for 
explaining the system framework, this research focused on a version taught by Professor 
                                                 
27 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System,” May 12, 2003, Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Chapter 4,  p. 2. 
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Rene Rendon, instructor for “Systems Defense and Contracting Course” at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  The basic framework builds around an adaptation of Schoderbek’s 
System Framework illustrated in Figure 1.  The flexibility of this framework breaks down 
the acquisition process into the external and internal variables that affect the process 








Adopted from Schoderbek, 
Schoderbek, & Kefalas (1985); and 
Sharkansky (1975)  
Figure 1.   The System Framework 
1. Environment  
The “environment” that surrounds the defense acquisition process is one of the 
largest and most complicated external influences. Table 4 lists some of the most 
influential entities within the system framework environment.  The executive branch 
includes the President, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the National 
Security Council (NSC), and the Department of Defense.28  The President looks to 
defense acquisition as an instrument to assist in the formulation, direction, and execution 
of his national security policy in an effort to maintain a balanced force structure.29  Since 
the 9/11 tragedy, Defense leaders have coordinated and managed acquisitions during a 
                                                 
28 Defense Acquisition University, “Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management – 6th Edition,” 
Defense Acquisition University Press, Fort Belvoir, VA: 25 Nov 2003, p 3.  
29 Ibid. 
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time of political unrest and multiple offensive war fronts.  DoD’s responsibilities rest in 
selecting and supporting those major defense acquisition programs that satisfy national 
security objectives and field weapons systems to defeat threats to national defense.30  
DoD struggles with providing the warfighter with the tools and resources to accomplish a 
mission, while attempting to satisfy regulatory and legislative requirements in cost, 
schedule, and performance.  OMB oversees the preparation of the federal budget and 
supervises the administration of procurements, financial management, information, and 
regulatory policies to reduce any unnecessary burdens on the public.31  Public perception 
has an untended manipulative effect on military acquisition programs. 
Table 4.   Environment – Defense Acquisition System Framework 
“Environment” 









As both Congress and the President “serve at the will of the people,” it is not 
surprising that the public’s interpretation on the success or failure of a defense program 
weighs heavily on the level of Congressional and Executive support for that program.  
The American taxpayer wants the most capable military in the world, yet, they have 
begun to voice dissatisfaction to over 30 years of cost and schedule overruns.  Public 
perception of the defense acquisition system as “broke and out of control” is a legitimate 
concern and permeates through the political reelection process.  The Defense Industry 
and Special Interest Groups utilize the political reelection process to influence the 
defense acquisition arena.  As these two entities provide political funding for both 
                                                 
30 Defense Acquisition University, “Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management – 6th Edition,” 
Defense Acquisition University Press, Fort Belvoir, VA: 25 November 2003, p 3. 
31 Office of Management and Budget, “OMB’s Mission,” website: http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/organization/role.htm (accessed 10 October 2007).  
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Congressional and Executive candidates, they mold or indirectly influence the defense 
acquisition process with the intent on bringing more dollars and jobs to specific states or 
jurisdictions.  
2. Input 
The “inputs” to the defense acquisition system framework revolve around the 
needs and desires to support the National Security Strategy, the available resources, and 
the obligatory Congressional checks and balances.  The President’s political agenda and 
policy determine employment of the nation’s military forces.  On top of the political 
agenda, geographic location, the enemy combat capabilities or threats, and world opinion 
all play a vital part in influence military missions.   
Resources dictate the utilization of specific inputs in the acquisition process to 
meet military missions.  Resources divide into tangible and intangible categories.  
Tangible resource fall into manpower, material, and appropriated funding issues; where 
as intangible resources are personnel skill levels, maturity of technology, and inflationary 
values. 
Table 5.   Input – Defense Acquisition System Framework 
“Input” 
Defense Acquisition System Framework 
Warfighter needs and desires 
Resources 
Regulations, Directives, Instructions 
Legislative Actions and Statutes 
Socio-economic needs and desires 
 
 
As DoD juggles the available resources, the needs and desires of both the 
warfighter and socio-economic characteristics are simultaneously funneled into the 
defense acquisition system framework.  Socio-economics studies the relationship 
between economic activity and social life where the social impact of economic change 
might include a closing factory, market manipulation, the signing of international trade 
  17
treaties, or the global availability of crude oil in Iraq.32  Rounding out the inputs is the 
nation’s system of checks and balances.  On a positive note, regulations, directives, and 
legislative actions, in a democratic society, help to institutionalize better business 
practices, while providing enough breathing room for the necessary interpretation.  On 
the downside, regulations and legislative actions are a continuous cycle and learning 
process.  Congressional responsibility requires its members to asked questions and 
demand explanations for how funding has been allocated.  It is important for the defense 
community to understand that bureaucratic red tape is a necessary by-product of 
democracy and a long-standing input to the defense acquisition process. 
3. Conversion 
As the Congressional body sets forth the policy, the “how to” is located within the 
conversion framework.  Beginning with the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) were the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identify and 
document the methodology of how the military services will determine warfighting needs 
through mission deficiencies or technological opportunities.33  The Planning 
Programming Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) System is utilized by DoD services and 
prescribes the process in making decisions on funding which provide the operational 
commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable with the 






                                                 
32 Wikipedia, “Definition of Socioeconomics,” http://en.wikipedia.org (accessed October 10, 2007). 
33 Defense Acquisition University, “Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management – 6th Edition,” 
Defense Acquisition University Press, Fort Belvoir, VA: 25 November 2003, p 23. 
34 Department of Defense Directive 7045.14, “The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System,” 
Certified Current as of November 21, 2003, p 2. 
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Table 6.   Conversion – Defense Acquisition System Framework 
“Conversion” 
Defense Acquisition System Framework
Requirements Determination (JCIDS) 
Resource Allocation (PPBE) 
Acquisition (DoD 5000) 




The conversion process is the most time consuming of all five elements.  Changes 
in policy and lessons learned, within the defense acquisition process, require the 
continuous updating of DoD directives.  The extensive number of directives and volume 
of publications, see Table 6, of the conversion process becomes one of familiarity vice 
memorization. 
4. Output 
The “output” or final product of any defense acquisition program typically is the 
successful fielding of the system or service.  What must not be overlook is the the 
program office reflecting on whether the system provides the nation the security or 
defense capabilities that originally was intended.  How has the socio-economic elements 
been influenced by the program completion?  Does the acquisition provide the 
operational priorities intended by the military?  The original “environmental” influences 
continue to affect a program’s operational and support requirements well after system 
fielding.   
Table 7.   Output – Defense Acquisition System Framework 
“Output” 








As with any task, the “feedback” provides the defense acquisition system 
framework with the opportunity to learn from mistakes and tweak the process.  Feedback 
is real-time or post-process.  With the average life cycle of defense acquisition programs 
at 10 to 20 years, real-time feedback appears in the form of Government Accountability 
Office Reports, Inspector General Reports, and Defense program reports on cost, 
schedule, and performance.  Acquisition Reforms and Business Transformational 
Initiatives are both by-products of critical analysis of the defense acquisition process.  
Feedback shapes and influences the environmental and input elements of the system. 
 
Table 8.   Feedback – Defense Acquisition System Framework 
“Feedback” 
Defense Acquisition System Framework 
Effects/Influences Environment & Inputs 
Transformational Initiatives 
Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
Government Accountability Office Reports 
Inspector General Reports 
 
B. EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAM “LIFE CYCLE” 
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
The evolution of the Defense Acquisition Program Management Framework has 
spanned twenty years from 1987 to 2007.  In 1989, Defense Systems Management 
College published the first edition of the “Introduction to Defense Acquisition 
Management.”  The guide or pamphlet, focusing on the DoD-wide applications, is 
published as a quick study to refresh the skilled and experienced person or introduce and 
enlighten the newcomer.35  Over the years, the varying editions of the pamphlet have 
focused on the changes in military guidance, Congressional direction, feedback, and 
                                                 
35 Defense Systems Management College, “Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management,” 
Virginia: Fort Belvoir, p. V. 
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reformation.  The life cycle framework is constructed around a simplistic design structure 
and activities: mission need, concept exploration, concept or technological development, 
system development, system demonstration, production, deployment, operations, support, 
and disposal.  The life cycle is broken down into time-base phases.  Each phase 
corresponding to the specific structure or activities within the life cycle process, as 
mentioned above.   
Concept exploration evaluates the feasibility of alternative concepts for meeting 
the mission need, determining the most promising concepts or solutions and then which 
concepts to be pursued.  Concept development focuses on the subsystems and 
components in a relevant environment prior to integration into a system.  Phase O has 
evolved into what is know as “Pre-Systems Acquisitions” including identification of 
mission needs to passing Milestone B entrance criteria.  Phase I, System Integration 
concentrates on integrating the subsystems and components and then testing them in a 
relevant environment.  Depending on the year, a MDAP began, this is known as the 
Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase or System Development & 
Demonstration (SDD) Phase.  Phase II, Production and Deployment is made up of areas: 
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full-Rate Production & Deployment (FRPD). 
Exiting LRIP is typically permitted only when the program illustrates technical 
maturity, no significant manufacturing risk, acceptable interoperability of subsystems and 
components, and operational supportability is shown to be at acceptable levels for the 
increased production.  
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Phases I and II are referred to as the “Systems Acquisitions” of a MDAP.  Finally, 
management framework “Sustainment” is the operational and support a program would 
require throughout it lifetime.  A programs eventual disposal, demilitarization, 
detoxification, waste storage and/or recycling at the end of its economic or physical 
service life would also fall under “Sustainment.” 
Decision points, referred to as milestones, separate phases and transitioning from 
one phase to another requires program officials attaining upper level approval.  
“Tailoring” of the process has allowed for adjustments to the life cycle process in order to 
respond to the unique programmatic circumstances of individual MDAPs.  Figures 2 and 
3 allow comparison of the life cycle frameworks developed and illustrate the evolutionary 
changes from 1989 to the present. 
                                                 
36 Defense Systems Management College, “Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management,” 
Virginia: Fort Belvoir, p. 15. 
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Figure 3.    Evolution of Acquisition Management Life Cycle Framework 1993 to 
Present 
Acquisition Management Life Cycle Framework 1993 thru 2001
Acquisition Management Life Cycle Framework 2001 thru 2003



















































































































































































































C. NUNN-MCCURDY AMENDMENT OF 1982 
1. Background 
In 1982, Senator Sam Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia (D-GA), with the help of 
Representative Dave McCurdy, Democrat from Oklahoma (D-OK), drafted a Conference 
Report that was included in the fiscal years Department of Defense (DoD) Authorization 
Act.  Known today as the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment, the objective of the legislation 
was to establish an exception reporting system on Major Defense Acquisition Program 
(MDAP) unit costs, in order to, track development as well as procurement cost growth 
and contract cost growth as a precursor of program costs.37 
The 1982 original language may be found coupled to the Selected Acquisition 
Report, March 1981.38  The original provisions required Program Managers to notify the 
Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) when unit cost growth on MDAPs reached at least 
15 percent in Program Acquisition Unit Costs (PAUC).  The SAE would give notice to 
Congress of the programs breached unit cost thresholds.  Furthermore, Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) Certification was mandatory if cost growth surpassed 25 percent 
PAUC requiring a written and/or testimonial justification.  SECDEF Certification entails 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) 
to address the following four statutory requirements.39 
• Program is essential to national security; 
• No alternatives to such acquisition program which will provide or 
greater military capability at less cost; 
• New estimates of the program acquisition unit cost or procurement 
unit cost are reasonable; and, 
                                                 
37 Larry Axtell, “Nunn-McCurdy Changes Presentation,” 2006 Business Managers’ Conference: 
Enabling Smart Business Decisions, 9-10 May Defense Acquisition University, Ft. Belvoir, VA. 
http://www.dau.mil/conferences/2006/documents/Session%202.pdf. 
38 Department of Defense Authorization Act 1982, Conference Report No. 97-311. Downloaded 
http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/s815-conf-rpt.cfm. 
39 Defense Link (2002), “Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breaches,” published May 2002, 
http://www.defenslink.mil/news/may2002/d20020502nme.pdf (accessed September 2007). 
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• Management structure for acquisition program is adequate to 
manage and control program acquisition unit cost or procurement 
unit costs. 
In the 1990’s, Senator Nunn’s reporting system consolidated with the existing 
internal Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) and external reports Selected 
Acquisition Reports Summary (SARs).40 
A DoD major defense acquisition program is not a highly sensitive classified 
program designated by the SECDEF or that is estimated by the SECDEF to require an 
eventual total expenditure for Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) of 
more than $300 million (Base on Fiscal Year 1990 constant dollars) or an eventual total 
expenditure for procurement of more than $1,800 million (BY 1990).”41  The following 
are expenditures calculated for a 2000 Base Year for determining an MDAP42: 
• RDT&E Costs >=  $365 million (BY00$) or  
• Procurement Costs >=  $2.19 billion (BY00$). 
The following is the specific location in United States Code Title 10 which 
discusses the objectives and reporting requirements: 
Title 10  Armed Forces 
Subtitle A  General Military Law 
Part IV Service, Supply, and Procurement 
Chapter 144 Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
Sections 2430 Major defense acquisition program defined 
 2431 Weapons development and procurement schedules 
 2432 Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) 
 2433 Unit cost report 
 2435 Baseline description 
                                                 
40 Larry Axtell, “Nunn-McCurdy Changes Presentation,” 2006 Business Managers’ Conference: 
Enabling Smart Business Decisions, 9-10 May Defense Acquisition University, Ft. Belvoir, VA. 
Downloaded http://www.dau.mil/conferences/2006/documents/Session%202.pdf. 
41 United States Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 144, Section 2430 Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs Defined, paragraph (a) (2). Download http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title10/ 
subtitlea_partiv_chapter144_.html. 
42 Larry Axtell, “Nunn-McCurdy Changes Presentation,” 2006 Business Managers’ Conference: 
Enabling Smart Business Decisions, 9-10 May Defense Acquisition University, Ft. Belvoir, VA. 
Downloaded http://www.dau.mil/conferences/2006/documents/Session%202.pdf. 
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MDAP managers are required to submit a quarterly Unit Cost Report (UCR), to 
their service executive designate, a written report addressing the program acquisition unit 
costs (PAUC)-- meaning the amount equal to43: 
• The total cost for development and procurement of, and system-specific 
military construction for , the acquisition program divided by 
• The number of fully configured end items to be procured within 30 
calendar days after the end of each quarter.   
The UCR summaries acquisition unit costs or procurement unit costs, cost or 
schedule variances since contract commencement, program schedule milestone or 
performance changes, and significant software cost, performance or schedule changes.44     
UCR begins at Milestone B (System Development and Demonstration) and UCR ends at 
90% complete of either deliveries or expenditures45.   
2. Nunn-McCurdy Threshold Modifications 
In 2006, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) enacted major reform 
of the acquisition process, specifically the Nunn-McCurdy Cost Thresholds.   
The House of Representative of the Committee on Armed Services release 
their report (HR 109-452) on the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007, listed in Title VIII—Acquisition Policy, Acquisition 
Management and related matters; one of four “Items of Special Interest” 
was the Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Reform in which 
the committee directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics … to submit a consolidated report describing 
efforts taken to implement major defense acquisition reform, as 
implemented by sections 801 and 802 of the NDAA FY 2006 and 
delivering to the SCAS and HS by March 01, 2007.  HASC reported they 
believed the DoD acquisition process was broken and could be supported 
by the rising cost/budget and lengthening schedules leading to fewer 
numbers of each platforms. 46 
                                                 
43 United States Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 144, Section 2432(a)(1). Download 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title10/ subtitlea_partiv_chapter144_.html.  
44 Ibid., Section 2433(b) (1)-(4). 
45 Ibid., Section 2432(g). 
46 Congressional Report: H.Rpt. 109-452 – Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of 
Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 Report to Accompany H.R. 
5122,” May 5, 2006, p 352 download at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/ndaafy07.html. 
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Sections 801 and 802, of the FY2006 NDAA address this reform.  Section 801 
required the certification of numerous requirements related to technological maturity, 
affordability, alternative acquisition strategies and compliance with relevant DoD 
policies, regulations and directives, prior to approval of Milestone B for a MDAP.47  
While Section 802 rewrote the Nunn-McCurdy amendment stopped the re-baselining of 
original baseline estimates for MDAPs and redefined the thresholds into two categories48, 
presented in Table 9. 
Table 9.   Reformed Nunn-McCurdy Categories and Thresholds 
CATEGORY THRESHOLDS 
“Significant cost growth threshold” 
> 15% over the PAUC for the program as 
shown in the current Baseline Estimates for 
the program, or 
 
> 30% over the PAUC for the program as 
shown in the original Baseline Estimate for 
the program 
“Critical cost growth threshold” 
> 25% over the PAUC for the program as 
shown in the current Baseline Estimates for 
the program, or 
 
> 50% over the PAUC for the program as 
shown in the original Baseline Estimate for 
the program 
 
A baseline estimate is generated taking into consideration sufficient parameters to 
describe the cost estimate, schedule, performance, supportability, and any other major 
factors and prepared for any MDAP before the program enters 49: 
• System Development and Demonstration; 
• Production and Deployment; and 
• Full Rate Production 
                                                 
47 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-168, January 6, 2006, 
pp. 232-234. 
48 Ibid. 
49 United States Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 144, Section 2435 (a) (2) & (c). 
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D. PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
A major problem encountered in researching the data requirements for this project 
was simply locating program cost and funding data.  As a student based research project, 
one of the intended products of this MBA Project is the exposure to indebt research 
methods and data compilation skills.  The task took well over three academic quarters to 
locate and filter cost data on the H-1 Upgrade Program; the journey provided additional 
exposure to a plethora of military and government journals, websites, and reports.  The 
publicly accessible data utilized in this report came from the following two web-based 
sites: 
• The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense – Comptroller, and 
• The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense – Acquisition 
Technology & Logistics  
The following two sections walk the reader through the process of locating naval 
service program data assuming that at the outset the reader has only the program name. 
1. Defense MDAP Budgetary Data 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense – Comptroller website is located at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/ .  After opening the Comptroller website, open 
the ‘Defense Budget’ tab on the left hand-side of the screen.  Next, follow the ‘DoD 
Summary Budget Materials/Budget Links’ tab.  Look for the individual YEAR tabs under 
the HOME tab; notice that 10 years of budgetary data is provide and will be in digital 
format for downloading.  Select the specific year desired prior to moving on to the next 
step.  Under ‘Summary Justification Materials’ the following list of Budget 
Appropriation Authorities are presented.   
• Military Personnel Program (M-1) 
• Operation and Maintenance Program (O-1) 
• Procurement Program (P-1) 
• Procurement Program Reserve Component (P-1R) 
• Research, Development, Test & Evaluation Program (R-1) 
• Military Construction, Family Housing, and Base Realignment and 
Closure Program (C-1)  
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Any defense program will fall under one or more of these authorities.  The final 
tab under the ‘Summary Justification Material’ offers the file “Program Acquisition Costs 
by Weapon System.”  This is a document prepared for by the DoD for the public or press 
and provides a short summary on all programs.  Though the document is convenient and 
provides basic information, it does not provide the information required to aid in locating 
the actual data of a program.   
The six budget authority program files typically list the DoD component 
summaries by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Agencies.  Utilize these summaries 
to locate specific program Line Numbers, Program Element Numbers, Item 
Nomenclature, and Budget Activity Codes all of which will refine the data search. 
Once you know the specific information outlined above for the naval program, 
follow the link ‘Navy Budget Documentation’ found under the ‘Links to Budget 
Material’ header on the right side of the screen ensuring to have first selected the 
appropriate YEAR tab.  Once again, select the appropriate budget authority for the 
program.  Depending on which budget authority selected there may be a choice of 
different volumes representing selected budget activity codes (BA 1 to 7) or distinctions 
by Navy and Marine Corps.  The final step is to search the document for the specific 
program.  Try utilizing the nomenclature or program element number to locate the 
justification data.  Do not be surprise if a program influences multiple program elements. 
Sorting through these differences will account for a majority of research labor hours 
exhausted.   
Each budget item justification submitted follows roughly the same outlined 
format:  
• Mission Description and Budget Item Justification 
• Program Change Summary 
• Accomplishments / Planned Program 
• Other Program Funding Summary 
• Acquisition Strategy 
• Cost Analysis 
• Schedule Profile 
• Schedule Detail 
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Congressional reductions, rescissions, undistributed reductions, and increases 
account for a majority of the ‘Program Change Summary’ along with economic 
assumptions or miscellaneous adjustments.  The ‘Accomplishments and Planned 
Program’ section provides a brief description and accounting breakdown of product 
development, support development, test & evaluation, program management support, and 
software support.  The ‘Other Program Funding Summary’ will alert reviews to other 
programs, which have an effect and directly relate to the program.  The ‘Cost Analysis’ 
section briefs the cost categories (product, support, test & evaluation, management) for 
contract method and type, performing activity and location, award and completion dates.  
The ‘Schedule Profile and Detail’ provide quarterly information, spanning eight fiscal 
years, for Milestones, Operational Evaluations, Low-rate and Full-rate production and 
including anticipated delivery numbers.  This data would be ideal for studying the 
scheduling delays associated with a program.  
2. Selected Acquisition Report 
Beginning in 1969, the Department of Defense (DoD) began reporting to 
Congress the status of major weapon system acquisitions through Selected Acquisition 
Report (SAR).  The SAR is a comprehensive report that contains information on the cost, 
schedule, and performance of major weapon systems in comparison with baseline values 
established at the demonstration/validation, full-scale development, and production 
decision points.50  United States Code Title 10, Section 2432 Selected Acquisition 
Reports, defines standard terms, submission timelines for status reports, reporting 
waivers or exemption criteria, and reporting requirements.   
The Deputy to the Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis/Acquisition 
Management (ARA/AM) is responsible for maintaining and updating Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR).  The ARA/AM website, where the “SAR Summary Tables” 
are located, is at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/index.html.  There are 130 reports 
accessible through the website for the period of December 1960 until June 2007.  As 
                                                 
50 DoD Instruction 7000.3-G, “Preparation and Review of Selected Acquisition Reports,” May 1980, 
Defense Technical Information Center, DTIC: AD-A267 936. 
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directed in USC Title 10, all MDAPs are required to submit a report at the end of the 
fiscal year first quarter.  Reporting during the second, third, and fourth quarter of the 
fiscal year is not required if the program meets the following criteria: less than a 15 
percent increase in PAUC and current PUC; and less than a six month delay in any of the 
program milestone schedule; and a report was submitted during a previous period.  Fiscal 
year waivers can only be authorized by the Secretary of Defense if (1) the program has 
not entered SDD; (2) a reasonable cost estimate has not been established; and (3) the 
system configuration is not well defined. 
There are five sections addressed in each quarterly Summary (1) SAR Narrative 
Highlights, (2) Program Acquisition Cost; (3) Distribution of Cost Changes – Base-Year 
Dollars, (4) Distribution of Cost Changes – Then-Year Dollars, and (5) Program Funding 
Status.  Each of these sections are discussed further. 
 
Table 10.   Sample SAR Narrative Highlights – Reported June 30, 2007 
Current Estimate
($ in Millions)
December 2006 (89 Programs) $1,683,973.8
Less final reports on two programs -5,568.4
Plus six new programs 11,096.6
December 2006 Adjusted (93 programs) $1,689,502.0














The ‘SAR Narrative Highlights’ begin by recapping the previous reported 
quarter’s current estimate of all the program acquisition costs and total number of 
programs.  Two adjustments account for the reduction in cost for programs that submitted 
their final reports last period and for any additions in cost for programs submitting their 
first SAR report during this quarter.  The ‘Net Cost Change’ is the total changes since the 
last report for those programs carrying over as seen in the six distribution categories: 
economic, quantity, schedule, engineering, estimating, support, and other, for all reported 
programs. 
If a program breaches the “Significant Cost Growth Threshold,” see Table 9, then 
a quarterly exception SAR is submittals and listed by service (Navy, Army, and Air 
Force) or multi-service defense programs.   
 



























Change To Date 
Adjust for Qty




The first table is the “Program Acquisition Cost Summary,” listed by service, then 
alphabetized by weapon system, a two digit base year and type of Baseline round out the 
first three columns.  The type of baseline is a reflection of where the program is within 
the acquisition system management framework: DE or PdE, which represent 
development/Milestone II or production/engineering/Milestone III, respectively.  Cost 
estimates are represented in both Base Year Dollars and Current Year Dollars.  Along 
with quantity, presenting the data in both base and current dollars allows the reviewer to 
check whether threshold limitations of the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment have been 
breached.  The ‘current estimate’ calculations follow the formula: 
 
(Baseline Estimate) - (Changes To Date) = (Current Estimate)  
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Finally, the ‘Percent Cost Change to Date’ is calculated for both Base Year $ 
(BY$) and Current Year $ (CY$).  The percent cost change is adjusted for quantity if 
program units have changed since Baseline Estimates.   
The second table published in the SAR is the “Distribution of Cost Changes – 
Base-Year Dollars.”  This table shows the representation of the cost variance distribution 
of the total “Cost Changes to Date” presented in the “Program Acquisition Cost 
Summary” table of the SAR.   These categories are defined in Table 12. 
Table 12.   Cost Variance Categories in Distribution Changes51 
COST VARIANCE CATEGORIES 
Economic  Changes due solely to operation of the economy or indices 
Quantity  Changes limited to end items of equipment for which PAUC or PUC reporting is required. 
Schedule Changes that affect the delivery schedule, procurement schedule, completion date or milestones for development or production 
Engineering Changes in the development of a system or item to be delivered, physically or functionally altered. 
Estimating  
Changes in the program cost due to a correction of error in preparing the 
DE or PdE, refinement of prior CE, or a change in program or cost 
estimating assumptions and techniques not provided for in the Quantity, 
Engineering, Schedule, or Support variance categories. 
Other 
Changes in program cost for reasons not provided for in the other cost 
variance categories; acts of God, work stoppage, federal or state law 
changes, unforeseeable events.   
Support 
Changes in cost, regardless of reason, associated with any work 
breakdown structure element associated with training and training 
equipment, peculiar support equipment, data, operational or site 
activation, and initial spares and repair parts. 
 
 
                                                 
51 DoD Instruction 7000.3-G, “Preparation and Review of Selected Acquisition Reports,” May 1980, 
Defense Technical Information Center, DTIC: AD-A267 936, pp. 3-5. 
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Table 13 is an example of the table header for a SAR Distribution of Cost 
Changes.   
Table 13.   Sample Table Header – SAR Distribution of Cost Changes 








The distribution changes are cost variance categories utilized to track the program 
monetary increases or decreases and definition provided below.  The” Economic” cost 
variance category is only found on the Then-Year table to account for inflation or 
economic indices that a program would not be able to control over the programs Life 
Cycle.  The third table is Distribution of Cost Changes – Then-Year Dollars and is set up 
just like the Base-Year Dollars.   
The final data reported in the SAR is the “Program Funding Status” where the 
total current year cost estimate is broken down into the prior-year expenditures, the 
anticipatory budgeting for the next two years, and the remaining balance of the program 
not yet budget or expended.   
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IV.  DATA, ANALYSIS AND RECONCILIATION 
A. COMPTROLLER DATA 
Comptroller data is published as part of the President’s Budget (PB) in the month 
of February.  The H-1 Upgrade Program funding data is submitted as both an RDT&E 
and a Procurement Program.   Since this program is reported under more than one Budget 
Authority (BA) it is necessary to collect both programs activities reported in the PB and 
add them together to represent the programs total costs. 
 Program Total Costs = RDT&E + APN 
1. Research Development Test & Evaluation Budget Item Justification 
The H-1 data are reported under the System Development & Demonstration 
Activity corresponding to a Budget Activity Code of 05 (BA-5).   
 




01 Basic Research 
02 Applied Research 
03 Advanced Technology Development 
04 Advanced Component Development & Prototypes 
05 System Development & Demonstration 
06 RDT&E Management Support 
07 Operational System Development 
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It is important to note that the program RDT&E documents still refers to 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) vice SDD.  Program Element 
Number is 0604245N and Program Element Title is ‘USMC H-1 Upgrade’.  Though 
Milestone II was entered in 1996, RDT&E data on the comptroller site is only available 
as far back as FY 2000, reported in February 1999.   
The compilation of a total of nine years of budgetary records, Table 16, provided 
the data utilized during the breach and reconciliation analysis.  Each row represents a 
record of data reported for a specific fiscal year, column 1, and the date reported, column 
2, in the President’s Budget.   All unit amounts are in millions of dollars. 
 
Table 16.   RDT&E Budget Item Justification Data -- $ Millions 
FY Report Date PriorY97 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005
2000 Feb-99 79.019 81.290 120.254 157.683 108.820 50.023 19.876 12.758
2001 Feb-00 79.019 81.290 116.746 183.266 139.680 48.960 18.286 9.451
2002 Jun-01 79.019 81.290 116.746 178.524 138.189 170.068
2003 Feb-02 79.019 81.290 116.746 178.556 133.324 170.448 241.384 80.547 54.506
2004 Feb-03 79.019 81.290 116.746 178.556 133.324 167.706 236.039 90.589 61.174
2005 Feb-04 79.019 81.290 116.746 178.556 133.324 167.456 232.229 90.965 90.389
2006 Feb-05 79.019 81.290 116.746 178.556 133.324 167.456 232.229 98.412 173.046
2007 Feb-06 79.019 81.290 116.746 178.556 133.324 167.456 232.229 100.719 168.171
2008 Feb-07 79.019 81.290 116.746 178.556 133.324 167.456 232.229 100.719 168.171








2004 Feb-03 11.168 8.035 3.831 3.836 1171.313
2005 Feb-04 10.907 7.723 3.525 3.525 1195.654
2006 Feb-05 42.012 7.700 3.620 3.680 3.815 3.940 1324.845
2007 Feb-06 41.382 7.844 3.656 3.832 3.970 3.767 1321.961




The nine records of data required 13 columns and due to the length required 
separation into two sections for presentation.  Data provided in each record or row 
represents either an existing budgeted amount or an estimated amount for the future.  
Budgetary records reported up to seven years of data, prior/current budgeted fiscal years 
and the next five fiscal years as estimates.  The President’s Budget is for the next fiscal 
year and reported in the February prior.   The FY 2002 PB data was not report until June 
2001.  The record does not address the late reporting date, but this period was 
immediately prior to the program threshold breach and the data may have been updated 
as part of or anticipation of the congressional certification process.  The final column, 
titled ‘Total RDT&E Cost’ is the summation of the justification data report from 
PriorY97 to FY2013 for each recorded year. 
2. Aircraft Procurement Budget Item Justification 
H-1 aircraft procurement data are reported under the Modification of Aircraft 
Activity corresponding to a Budget Activity Code of 05 (BA-5). 
 




01 Combat Aircraft 
02 Airlift Aircraft 
03 Trainer Aircraft 
04 Other Aircraft 
05 Modification of Aircraft 
06 Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts 
07 Aircraft Support Equipment & Facilities 
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Five years of procurement data are available on the comptroller site starting with 
FY 2003, reported on February 2002, until FY 2008, reported on February 2008.  Table 
18 provides this data with each record represented in the rows.  Data from each record 
that is budgeted or estimated by fiscal year are arranged in groups.   
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Table 18.   Aircraft Procurement Budget Item Justification Data — $ Millions 
































2000 Feb-99 5 85.340 17.068 17 228.584 13.446
2001 Feb-00 5 125.624 25.125 17 223.166 13.127
2003 Feb-02 5.987 5.987
2004 Feb-03 5.987 5.987
2005 Feb-04 5.987 5.987
2006 Feb-05 5.987 5.987 0
2007 Feb-06
2008 Feb-07
































2000 Feb-99 24 307.418 307.418 12.809 36 386.017 386.017 10.723
2001 Feb-00 24 308.985 308.985 12.874 36 377.131 377.131 10.476
2003 Feb-02 9 282.824 43.282 326.106 36.234 11 254.568 80.053 334.621 30.420 22 416.022 166.830 582.852 26.493
2004 Feb-03 9 310.799 20.138 330.937 36.771 7 200.420 11.089 211.509 30.216 14 338.645 16.670 355.315 25.380
2005 Feb-04 9 308.492 16.180 324.672 36.075 9 241.792 9.088 250.880 27.876 12 337.685 29.394 367.079 30.590
2006 Feb-05 9 308.562 19.034 327.596 36.400 7 198.858 16.581 215.439 30.777 10 307.479 51.081 358.560 35.856
2007 Feb-06 (1) 9 319.110 15.878 334.988 37.221 7 213.061 15.384 228.445 32.635 10 314.450 36.994 351.444 35.144
2008 Feb-07 9 319.110 15.878 334.988 37.221 7 213.061 15.384 228.445 32.635 7 314.011 41.075 355.086 50.727


































2003 Feb-02 28 465.283 142.053 607.336 21.691
2004 Feb-03 23 453.639 78.670 532.309 23.144 23 466.531 86.222 552.753 24.033 24 473.842 0.332 474.174 19.757
2005 Feb-04 19 431.934 48.415 480.349 25.282 21 467.211 84.461 551.672 26.270 21 454.563 0.000 454.563 21.646
2006 Feb-05 18 434.942 48.417 483.359 26.853 21 471.633 75.161 546.794 26.038 21 443.578 41.921 485.499 23.119
2007 Feb-06 18 446.718 74.937 521.655 28.981 19 440.817 12.676 453.493 23.868 23 484.852 3.896 488.748 21.250
2008 Feb-07 (2) 11 443.805 51.588 495.393 45.036 20 518.475 61.718 580.193 29.010 25 564.421 27.304 591.725 23.669





































2006 Feb-05 22 482.196 47.909 530.105 24.096 23 501.740 47.866 549.606 23.896
2007 Feb-06 23 503.940 7.650 511.590 22.243 23 504.865 7.650 512.515 22.283
2008 Feb-07 28 644.200 9.624 653.824 23.351 28 645.595 24.616 670.211 23.936 24 554.846 0.000 554.846 23.119






















# A/C Cost A/C Program Cost $ per A/C
2000 Feb-99 82 1007.359 0.000 693.435 12.285 198 1922.629 280 2929.988 10.46 0
2001 Feb-00 82 1034.906 0.000 686.116 12.621 198 1902.343 280 2937.249 10.49 0.25%
2003 Feb-02 70 1424.684 432.218 1856.902 26.527 210 3253.038 280 5109.940 18.25 73.97%
2004 Feb-03 100 2249.863 213.121 2462.984 24.630 180 3097.808 280 5560.792 19.86 8.82%
2005 Feb-04 91 2247.664 187.538 2435.202 26.760 189 3206.825 280 5642.027 20.15 1.46%
2006 Feb-05 131 3154.975 347.970 3502.945 26.740 149 3173.163 280 6676.108 23.84 18.33%
2007 Feb-06 132 3227.813 175.065 3402.878 25.779 148 3234.058 280 6636.936 23.70 -0.59%
2008 Feb-07 24 563.713 0.000 563.713 23.488 183 4781.237 247.187 5028.424 27.478 97 2331.933 280 7360.357 26.29 10.90%
(1) $10.8 M received in FY 2006 Title IX funding




























Each group has five columns of data: number of aircraft, weapon system cost, 
initial spares, procurement cost, and unit cost.  Weapon system costs include, but limited 
to, the cost of the airframe, engines, publications, production engineering support, 
armament, and facilities management.  “Initial spares are deliverable spare components, 
assemblies and subassemblies used for initial replacement purposes in the materiel 
system equipment end item.  For example repairable spares and repair parts required as 
initial stockage to support and maintain newly fielded systems or subsystems during the 
initial phase of service, including pipeline and war reserve quantities, at all levels of 
maintenance and support.”52  Procurement costs are equal to weapon system costs plus 
initial spares. 
 Proc Cost = Wpn Sys Cost + Initial Spares 
Unit costs in each grouped fiscal year data is for that specific year only.  After the 
FY2013 data group, all records are summed to provide a ‘Total for FY2001 through FY 
2013.   The ‘To Complete’ aircraft numbers and costs is the dollar amount estimated and 
projected for the years beyond the last fiscal year reported for that record.  For example, 
the FY2004, Report Date Feb-03, has data budgeted and estimated for FY2004 through 
FY2009.  The ‘Total Program Cost will equal FY2004 through FY2009 plus the 
remaining to complete costs. 
Total Program Cost  =  (Total FY2004 thru FY2009)    +    To Complete 
B. SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT SUMMARY DATA 
The DoD submitted the initial SAR for H-1 Upgrade Program in the December 
1996.  The baseline established on the program from this point reported at $3,571.3 
Million.  Data from 29 records, spanning 11-years, from the following three SAR tables 
provide the necessary data to analyze threshold breaches and reconciliation: Program 
Acquisition Cost Summary, Distribution of Cost Changes BY$, and Program Funding 
Status.  Program Officials submitted SAR data three times a year: June, September, and 
December, though in most cases changes only occurred in the month of December.  
                                                 
52 Department of Defense Handbook, “Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Materiel Items,” 
MIL-HDBK-881A: 30 July 2005, p126, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ pm/currentpolicy/wbs/MIL_HDBK-
881A/MILHDBK881A/ WebHelp3/MILHDBK881A.htm (accessed November 2007). 
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Missing from the records is data between the period of September 2000 and September 
2001.  Again, this period was immediately prior to the program threshold breach and the 
data may have been updated as part of, or in anticipation to, the congressional 
certification process.  Tables 19 through 21 present the data as submitted in the SAR and 
provide a consolidated format for reporting and analysis.   
 

















30-Jun-97 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 -4.8 23.8 2787.7 3571.3 284 -0.2 0.7
25-Sep-97 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 -4.8 23.8 2787.7 3571.3 284 -0.2 0.7
31-Dec-97 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 17.7 -117 2,810.2 3,430.5 284 0.6 -3.3
30-Jun-98 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 17.7 -117 2,810.2 3430.5 284 0.6 -3.3
30-Sep-98 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 17.7 -117 2810.2 3430.5 284 0.6 -3.3
31-Dec-98 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 264.9 96.2 3057.4 3643.7 284 9.5 2.7
30-Jun-99 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 264.9 96.2 3057.4 3643.7 284 9.5 2.7
30-Sep-99 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 264.9 96.2 3057.4 3643.7 284 9.5 2.7
31-Dec-99 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 377.1 183.5 3169.6 3731 284 13.5 5.2
30-Jun-00 97 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 377.1 183.5 3169.6 3731 284 13.5 5.2
30-Sep-00 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 377.1 183.5 3169.6 3731 284 13.5 5.2
30-Sep-01 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 330.4 163.4 -5 3122.9 3710.9 279 11.8 4.6
31-Dec-01 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 2350.7 2687.1 5143.2 6234.6 284 84.2 75.7
30-Jun-02 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 2350.7 2687.1 5143.2 6234.6 284 84.2 75.7
30-Sep-02 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 2350.7 2687.1 5143.2 6234.6 284 84.2 75.7
31-Dec-02 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 2785.4 3173.7 5577.9 6721.2 284 99.7 89.5
30-Jun-03 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 2785.4 3173.7 5577.9 6721.2 284 99.7 89.5
30-Sep-03 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 2785.4 3173.7 5577.9 6721.2 284 99.7 89.5
31-Dec-03 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 2853 3279.8 5645.5 6827.3 284 102.2 92.5
30-Jun-04 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 2853 3279.8 5645.5 6827.3 284 102.2 92.5
30-Sep-04 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 2853 3279.8 5645.5 6827.3 284 102.2 92.5
31-Dec-04 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 3503.7 4457 6296.2 8004.5 284 125.5 125.6
30-Jun-05 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 3503.7 4457 6296.2 8004.5 284 125.5 125.6
30-Sep-05 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 3528.9 4485.3 6321.4 8032.8 284 126.4 126.4
31-Dec-05 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 3425.4 4467.8 6217.9 8015.3 284 122.7 125.9
30-Jun-06 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 3425.4 4467.8 6217.9 8015.3 284 122.7 125.9
30-Sep-06 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 3425.4 4467.8 6217.9 8015.3 284 122.7 125.9
31-Dec-06 96 DE 2,792.5 3,547.5 284 3902 5159 6694.5 8706.5 284 139.7 145.4

















Table 20.   Distribution of Cost Change From June 1997 to June 2007 – BY Dollars 
This Qtr To Date This Qtr To Date This Qtr To Date This Qtr To Date This Qtr To Date This Qtr To Date This Qtr To Date
30-Jun-97 96 -4.8 -4.8 -4.8
25-Sep-97 96 -4.8 -4.8
31-Dec-97 96 -4.8 22.4 22.4 0.1 0.1 22.5 17.7
30-Jun-98 96 -4.8 22.4 0.1 17.7
30-Sep-98 96 -4.8 22.4 0.1 17.7
31-Dec-98 96 -4.8 198.4 220.8 21.0 21.0 27.9 27.9 247.3 264.9
30-Jun-99 96 -4.8 220.8 21.0 27.9 264.9
30-Sep-99 96 -4.8 220.8 21.0 27.9 264.9
31-Dec-99 96 -4.8 220.8 45.8 66.8 66.4 94.3 112.2 377.1
30-Jun-00 96 -4.8 220.8 66.8 94.3 377.1
30-Sep-00 96 -4.8 220.8 66.8 94.3 377.1
30-Sep-01 96 -4.8 220.8 12.2 79.0 -58.9 35.4 -46.7 330.4
31-Dec-01 96 32.6 27.8 139.2 360.0 1,401.6 1,480.6 446.9 482.3 2,020.3 2,350.7
30-Jun-02 96 27.8 360.0 1,480.6 482.3 2,350.7
30-Sep-02 96 27.8 360.0 1,480.6 482.3 2,350.7
31-Dec-02 96 5.3 33.1 21.4 381.4 501.6 1,982.2 -93.6 388.7 434.7 2,785.4
30-Jun-03 96 33.1 381.4 1,982.2 388.7 2,785.4
30-Sep-03 96 33.1 381.4 1,982.2 388.7 2,785.4
31-Dec-03 96 28.9 62.0 381.4 -120.1 1,862.1 158.8 547.5 67.6 2,853.0
30-Jun-04 96 62.0 381.4 1,862.1 547.5 2,853.0
30-Sep-04 96 62.0 381.4 1,862.1 547.5 2,853.0
31-Dec-04 96 97.5 159.5 87.4 468.8 157.3 2,019.4 308.5 856.0 650.7 3,503.7
30-Jun-05 96 159.5 468.8 2,019.4 856.0 3,503.7
30-Sep-05 96 159.5 468.8 10.8 2,030.2 14.4 870.4 25.2 3,528.9
31-Dec-05 96 159.5 468.8 34.0 2,064.2 -137.5 732.9 -103.5 3,425.4
30-Jun-06 96 159.5 468.8 2,064.2 732.9 3,425.4
30-Sep-06 96 159.5 468.8 2,064.2 732.9 3,425.4
31-Dec-06 96 18.5 178.0 468.8 381.5 2,445.7 76.6 809.5 476.6 3,902.0





Table 21.   Program Funding Status From June 1997 to June 2007 
Date Prior Year FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 Total Funding Status [PY+FY]
Balance of 
Program Total Report
30-Jun-97 70 80.7 90.3 241.0 3,330.3 3,571.3
30-Sep-97 70 80.7 90.3 241.0 3330.3 3571.3
31-Dec-97 68.1 83.6 98.5 250.2 3,180.3 3,430.5
30-Jun-98 68.1 83.6 98.5 250.2 3,180.3 3,430.5
30-Sep-98 68.1 83.6 98.5 250.2 3,180.3 3,430.5
31-Dec-98 269.5 157.7 109.6 536.8 3,106.9 3,643.7
30-Jun-99 269.5 157.7 109.6 536.8 3,106.9 3,643.7
30-Sep-99 269.5 157.7 109.6 536.8 3,106.9 3,643.7
31-Dec-99 266.1 183.3 139.7 589.1 3,141.9 3,731.0
30-Jun-00 266.1 183.3 139.7 589.1 3141.9 3731
30-Sep-00 266.1 183.3 139.7 589.1 3,141.9 3,731.0
30-Sep-01 583.8 170.1 269.6 1,023.5 2,687.4 3,710.9
31-Dec-01 583.8 170.5 241.4 995.7 5,238.9 6,234.6
30-Jun-02 583.8 170.5 241.4 995.7 5,238.9 6,234.6
30-Sep-02 583.8 170.5 241.4 995.7 5,238.9 6,234.6
31-Dec-02 987.7 421.5 272.7 1,681.9 5,039.3 6,721.2
30-Jun-03 987.7 421.5 272.7 1,681.9 5,039.3 6,721.2
30-Sep-03 987.7 421.5 272.7 1,681.9 5,039.3 6,721.2
31-Dec-03 983.9 415.7 341.3 1,740.9 5,086.4 6,827.3
30-Jun-04 983.9 415.7 341.3 1,740.9 5,086.4 6,827.3
30-Sep-04 983.9 415.7 341.3 1,740.9 5,086.4 6,827.3
31-Dec-04 1,812.7 400.6 491.1 2,704.4 5,300.1 8,004.5
30-Jun-05 1,812.7 400.6 491.1 2,704.4 5,300.1 8,004.5
30-Sep-05 1,823.3 400.5 502.5 2,726.3 5,306.5 8,032.8
31-Dec-05 1,826.5 392.9 529.4 2,748.8 5,266.5 8,015.3
30-Jun-06 1,826.5 392.9 529.4 2,748.8 5,266.5 8,015.3
30-Sep-06 1,826.5 392.9 529.4 2,748.8 5,266.5 8,015.3
31-Dec-06 2,737.1 583.8 595.6 3,916.5 4,790.0 8,706.5
30-Jun-07 2,737.1 583.8 595.6 3,916.5 4,790.0 8,706.5  
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C. ANALYSIS AND RECONCILIATION 
Analysis of the data will provide answers to (1) how recent acquisition reform of 
the Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds affected the program, (2) whether cost increases have 
stabilized, (3) contributions of cost variance categories, and (4) investigations into 
reconciliation between SAR and PB data. 
1. Analysis 
In order to research the effects of the cost threshold changes of the FY2006 
NDAA, calculate the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) Growth from one year to 
the next and then translated into a percent change.   
 
 (CE PAUC  BE PAUC)PAUC Growth, % = *100
BE PAUC
−  where, 
 








Next, the percent change from one year to the next will provide the information 
needed to determine whether a significant or critical threshold was exceeded.  As stated 
in Chapter III.C.2, Table 9, the threshold limits for the H-1 Upgrade Program are 30/50 
because the program is still utilizing the ‘original’ Baseline Estimate from 1996. 
 
current to previous current previousChange  PAUC Growth  PAUC Growth= −  
 
It is worth pointing out that a comparison of the ‘PAUC Growths’ calculated, 
Table 22, and the ‘Percent Cost Change To Date’, Table 18, reveals that these two pieces 
of calculated data seem to be the same.  This has occurred because the H-1 program has 




quantities change, over the SDD life cycle, would most likely see different results for 
these two calculations.  PAUC changes as unit quantity changes and Cost Changes do not 
take into consideration 
Table 22.    Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) Estimates and Growth From June 
1997 to June 2007 in BY $ 
[BY $] [BY $]
30-Jun-97 9.833 9.816 -0.17
25-Sep-97 9.833 9.816 -0.17 0.00
31-Dec-97 9.833 9.895 0.63 0.81
30-Jun-98 9.833 9.895 0.63 0.00
30-Sep-98 9.833 9.895 0.63 0.00
31-Dec-98 9.833 10.765 9.49 8.85
30-Jun-99 9.833 10.765 9.49 0.00
30-Sep-99 9.833 10.765 9.49 0.00
31-Dec-99 9.833 11.161 13.50 4.02
30-Jun-00 9.833 11.161 13.50 0.00
30-Sep-00 9.833 11.161 13.50 0.00
30-Sep-01 9.833 11.193 13.84 0.33
31-Dec-01 9.833 18.110 84.18 70.34
30-Jun-02 9.833 18.110 84.18 0.00
30-Sep-02 9.833 18.110 84.18 0.00
31-Dec-02 9.833 19.640 99.75 15.57
30-Jun-03 9.833 19.640 99.75 0.00
30-Sep-03 9.833 19.640 99.75 0.00
31-Dec-03 9.833 19.879 102.17 2.42
30-Jun-04 9.833 19.879 102.17 0.00
30-Sep-04 9.833 19.879 102.17 0.00
31-Dec-04 9.833 22.170 125.47 23.30
30-Jun-05 9.833 22.170 125.47 0.00
30-Sep-05 9.833 22.258 126.37 0.90
31-Dec-05 9.833 21.894 122.66 -3.71
30-Jun-06 9.833 21.894 122.66 0.00
30-Sep-06 9.833 21.894 122.66 0.00
31-Dec-06 9.833 23.572 139.73 17.07













Growth     
[% in BY $]
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The PAUC Growth for each report submittal was plotted in Figure 4.  The vertical 
jumps in the figure represent the major cost increases from one year to the next.  Note the 
largest vertical rise from September 2001 to December 2001.  This is the period when the 
H-1 Upgrade Program had their cost growth threshold breach.  In December 2001, the 
PAUC increased by 70.3 percent from the previous year.   
 


































































































FY06 NDAA Nunn-McCurdy 
Threshold Changes
 
Figure 4.   PAUC Growth BY $ H-1 Upgrade Program 
During this time, program breaches were still regulated under the initial Nunn-
McCurdy limits of 15/25, where increases of 15 percent require Congressional 
notification and 25 percent required SECDEF certification.  The H-1 Upgrade Program 
breach explanation indicated the primary reasons were:53  
• Revised estimates for development cost, 
• Increased testing requirements, 
                                                 
53 Defense Link News (2002), “Nunn-McCurdy (NM) Unit Cost Breaches,” Published May 2002,  
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/may2002/d200020502.nme.pdf. 
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• Increased contractor overhead rates base on a contraction in 
business base, 
• Increased estimate of production labor hours and 
• Increased cost of material 
The H-1 Program data analysis indicates only two more incidences of cost growth 
increases before the new regulations went into effect: December 2002 and December 
2004.  Both increases were above 15 percent but below 25 percent, lending to 
Congressional notification only and not requiring certification.  The PAUC growth for 
CY$, Table 23, was also calculated to see if there was any substantial differences in the 
growth factors calculated utilizing base year $ verses current year $.  A plot of the CY$ 
data, Figure 5, shows the similar pattern of increases to that of the BY$ data above. 
Table 23.   Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) Estimates and Growth from June 
1997 to June 2007 in CY $ 
[CY $] [CY $]
30-Jun-97 12.49 12.58 0.67 0.67
25-Sep-97 12.49 12.58 0.67 0.00
31-Dec-97 12.49 12.08 -3.30 -3.97
30-Jun-98 12.49 12.08 -3.30 0.00
30-Sep-98 12.49 12.08 -3.30 0.00
31-Dec-98 12.49 12.83 2.71 6.01
30-Jun-99 12.49 12.83 2.71 0.00
30-Sep-99 12.49 12.83 2.71 0.00
31-Dec-99 12.49 13.14 5.17 2.46
30-Jun-00 12.49 13.14 5.17 0.00
30-Sep-00 12.49 13.14 5.17 0.00
30-Sep-01 12.49 13.07 4.61 -0.57
31-Dec-01 12.49 21.95 75.75 71.14
30-Jun-02 12.49 21.95 75.75 0.00
30-Sep-02 12.49 21.95 75.75 0.00
31-Dec-02 12.49 23.67 89.46 13.72
30-Jun-03 12.49 23.67 89.46 0.00
30-Sep-03 12.49 23.67 89.46 0.00
31-Dec-03 12.49 24.04 92.45 2.99
30-Jun-04 12.49 24.04 92.45 0.00
30-Sep-04 12.49 24.04 92.45 0.00
31-Dec-04 12.49 28.18 125.64 33.18
30-Jun-05 12.49 28.18 125.64 0.00
30-Sep-05 12.49 28.28 126.44 0.80
31-Dec-05 12.49 28.22 125.94 -0.49
30-Jun-06 12.49 28.22 125.94 0.00
30-Sep-06 12.49 28.22 125.94 0.00
31-Dec-06 12.49 30.66 145.43 19.48


















































































































FY06 NDAA Nunn-McCurdy 
Threshold Changes
 
Figure 5.   PAUC Growth CY $ H-1 Upgrade Program 
A side-by-side comparison of the BY$ and CY$ growth values, Table 23, does 
highlight a few difference.   The largest difference, during the December 2004 period, is a 
10 point difference in the PAUC growth values when utilizing Base Year $ verses 
Current Year $.  This difference causes the percent change in PAUC cost growth to rise 
beyond 30%, the reformed breach thresholds requiring Congressional notification.  This 
diversity in BY$ and CY$ illustrates the possible difference that can be obtained when 
calculating threshold values and highlights the need to do both calculations.  Research 
into the Nunn-McCurdy Threshold did not seem to isolate in which dollar values (Base 
Year or Current Year) that the Categories or Threshold values represented. Calculations 
only distinguished the requirement between original or current “Baseline Estimate” when 
determining threshold breaches with PAUC growth. 
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Is it possible to say from the PAUC values if the program has stabilized cost 
increases?  If a program is still utilizing the original baseline year then threshold values at 
30/50 might indicate stability as long as the program does not surpass the ‘significant’ 
threshold value.  Since the program’s threshold breach, reported in December 2001, the 
program has seen increases ranging from 15 to 23 in BY$.  Exploring the impact of each 
cost variance category and their individual influences over the ranges further investigates 
into the stability of the program. 
The seven cost variances are quantity, other, support, schedule, engineering, 
economic, and estimating.  The H-1 program did not change the quantity of end items or 
aircraft to be procured, therefore, quantity is not considered as an influence in cost 
increases or instability.  The program never reported ‘other’ change increases.  Some 
consider both quantity and other changes as baseline cost changes that are considered 
beyond the control of the program manager; yet, many programs adjust quantity to offset 
or reduce actual dollar value increases in a program that would never be granted 
congressional budgetary increases.   Economic and estimating changes are characterized 
as future costs growth that may or may not be realized.  ‘Actual’ cost variances are 
represented by events from within supporting, scheduling, or engineering categories that 
have or will result in cost changes. 
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First, the cumulative change and percent cumulative total of each cost variance 
category was calculated.  A stacked-area chart displaying the trend and cumulative 
contribution of each variance category, in relation to total costs reported, provides further 
explanations into the program instability and cost increases.  It was necessary to build 
two separate graphs, one, representing the distribution prior to the breach in December 
2001 and another after the breach.  The cost increase was so drastic, after December 
2001, that graphing the entire timeline together prevented seeing the individual category 
distributions in the early years of the SDD phase.   
Table 25.   Cost Variance Categories Percent Contribution to Cost Changes From June 






















30-Jun-97 96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.8
25-Sep-97 96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.8
31-Dec-97 96 0.0 0.0 22.4 126.6 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 17.7
30-Jun-98 96 0.0 0.0 22.4 126.6 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 17.7
30-Sep-98 96 0.0 0.0 22.4 126.6 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 17.7
31-Dec-98 96 0.0 0.0 220.8 83.4 21.0 7.9 27.9 10.5 264.9
30-Jun-99 96 0.0 0.0 220.8 83.4 21.0 7.9 27.9 10.5 264.9
30-Sep-99 96 0.0 0.0 220.8 83.4 21.0 7.9 27.9 10.5 264.9
31-Dec-99 96 0.0 0.0 220.8 58.6 66.8 17.7 94.3 25.0 377.1
30-Jun-00 96 0.0 0.0 220.8 58.6 66.8 17.7 94.3 25.0 377.1
30-Sep-00 96 0.0 0.0 220.8 58.6 66.8 17.7 94.3 25.0 377.1
30-Sep-01 96 0.0 0.0 220.8 66.8 79.0 23.9 35.4 10.7 330.4
31-Dec-01 96 32.6 1.4 360.0 15.3 1,480.6 63.0 482.3 20.5 2,350.7
30-Jun-02 96 32.6 1.4 360.0 15.3 1,480.6 63.0 482.3 20.5 2,350.7
30-Sep-02 96 32.6 1.4 360.0 15.3 1,480.6 63.0 482.3 20.5 2,350.7
31-Dec-02 96 37.9 1.4 381.4 13.7 1,982.2 71.2 388.7 14.0 2,785.4
30-Jun-03 96 37.9 1.4 381.4 13.7 1,982.2 71.2 388.7 14.0 2,785.4
30-Sep-03 96 37.9 1.4 381.4 13.7 1,982.2 71.2 388.7 14.0 2,785.4
31-Dec-03 96 66.8 2.3 381.4 13.4 1,862.1 65.3 547.5 19.2 2,853.0
30-Jun-04 96 66.8 2.3 381.4 13.4 1,862.1 65.3 547.5 19.2 2,853.0
30-Sep-04 96 66.8 2.3 381.4 13.4 1,862.1 65.3 547.5 19.2 2,853.0
31-Dec-04 96 164.3 4.7 468.8 13.4 2,019.4 57.6 856.0 24.4 3,503.7
30-Jun-05 96 164.3 4.7 468.8 13.4 2,019.4 57.6 856.0 24.4 3,503.7
30-Sep-05 96 164.3 4.7 468.8 13.3 2,030.2 57.5 870.4 24.7 3,528.9
31-Dec-05 96 164.3 4.8 468.8 13.7 2,064.2 60.3 732.9 21.4 3,425.4
30-Jun-06 96 164.3 4.8 468.8 13.7 2,064.2 60.3 732.9 21.4 3,425.4
30-Sep-06 96 164.3 4.8 468.8 13.7 2,064.2 60.3 732.9 21.4 3,425.4
31-Dec-06 96 182.8 4.7 468.8 12.0 2,445.7 62.7 809.5 20.7 3,902.0
30-Jun-07 96 182.8 4.7 468.8 12.0 2,445.7 62.7 809.5 20.7 3,902.0
Average Before Breach 0.0 72.7 8.5 9.8








Prior to the breach, the engineering cost variance accounted for, on average, more 
than 72% of the total cost increases recorded by the program.  These changes represent 
the development of the system or items delivered that physically or functionally are 
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altered.  During this period, schedule cost variances that affect delivery, procurement, and 
milestones were reported as not having had any influence on cost increase, zero percent.  
The remaining 28% of the average total cost increase is split between the supporting 
requirements and estimations due to correction of error in preparation of the prior cost 
estimate.   Toward the end of 2000, supporting requirements began to account for a larger 
share of the two variances. 
 
Contribution of Individual Cost Variances to Total Program 
Cost Increase From June 1997 to September 2001





















































































Figure 6.   Contribution of Individual Cost Variances to Total Program Cost Increases 
From June 1997 to September 2001 
After the breach period, more than 63% of the total cost increase on average was 
attributed to estimating changes.  The baseline cost estimate has not been adjusted since 
the beginning of the program; therefore, most cost variances can be due to the major 
correction in the December 2001 estimate, and/or changes in program or cost estimating 
assumptions and techniques. Engineering and support variances attributed to, on average, 
approximately 14 and 20 percent of the cost variances, respectively. Engineering cost 
variances did not decrease; they were only offset by the large estimating increase after the 
breach.  After the breach and an apparent reevaluation of program cost, the scheduling 
cost variance began to have its effect on approximately 3% of the total costs.   
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Contribution of Individual Cost Variancesto Total Program 
Cost Increase From September  2001 to June 2007 






















































































































Figure 7.   Contribution of Individual Cost Variances to Total Program Cost Increase 
From September 2001 to June 2007 
2. SAR and President’s Budget Reconciliation 
“The Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) is part of the enterprise architecture 
for the Department of Defense Business Mission Area (BMA) and includes activities, 
processes, data standards, business rules, operating requirements, and information 
exchanges. The transformation effort guiding BEA development focuses on providing 
tangible outcomes for a limited set of priorities and on developing an architecture that is 
integrated, understandable, and actionable.”54  Six Business Enterprise Priorities define 
these: Acquisition Visibility (AV), Common Supplier Engagement (CSE), Financial 
Visibility (FV), Materiel Visibility (MV), Personnel Visibility (PV), and Real Property 
Accountability (RPA). 
Acquisition Visibility is defined as achieving timely access to accurate, 
authoritative, and reliable information supporting acquisition oversight, 
                                                 
54 Business Transformation Agency, “BEA 4.1 Summary,” March 15, 2007, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/DBT/products/2007_BEA_ETP/bea /products/ bea_ summary.pdf (accessed 
Novermber 17, 2007).  
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accountability, and decision making throughout the Department for 
effective and efficient delivery of warfighter capabilities. Acquisition 
Visibility brings transparency to critical information supporting full 
lifecycle management of the Department’s processes that deliver weapon 
systems and automated information systems. This goal fully supports the 
responsibilities, scope, objectives, and business transformation 
requirements of the Weapons Systems Lifecycle Management (WSLM) 
CBM.55 
A gap addressed in AV is the establishment of a SAR and PB Reconciliation Task 
Force that will study and provide recommendation for resolving discrepancies between 
data reported in SARs and the data provided in the PB FYDP.  In October 30-31, 2007 at 
a Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) conference 
presentation, Gary Bliss, from the ARA, O/USD AT&L, presented a task force update 
where he provided multiple case studies in which the differences in SAR and PB reported 
data raised the issue that the DoD Financial System is flawed.56   




Date RDT&E APN SAR
Reconcile 
Differences
2000 Feb-99 629.72 2,929.99 3,643.70 83.99
2001 Feb-00 676.70 2,937.25 3,731.00 117.05
2002 Jun-01 763.84 3,710.90
2003 Feb-02 1,135.82 5,109.94 6,234.60 -11.16
2004 Feb-03 1,171.31 5,560.79 6,721.20 -10.91
2005 Feb-04 1,195.65 5,642.03 6,827.30 -10.38
2006 Feb-05 1,324.85 6,676.11 8,004.50 3.55
2007 Feb-06 1,321.96 6,636.94 8,015.30 56.40
2008 Feb-07 1,346.10 7,360.36 8,706.50 0.04  
 
Because reported SAR Program Funding Data, Table 21, do not fall in line with 
the PB, the closest SAR funding data submission was utilized for reconciliation.  In most 
cases, this was the previous December SAR data submissions.  The largest reconciled 
difference is seen during FY 2007.  While $56.4 Million is not a small sum by any 
                                                 
55 Business Transformation Agency Acquisition Visibility website definitions and goals, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/DBT/ products/2007_BEA_ETP/etp/AV-Chart.html. 
56 Gary Bliss, “SAR to President’s Budget (PB) Reconciliation Task Force Update,” October 30 and 
31, 2007, slide 6, https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=180027&lang=en-US. 
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means, this amount made up less than 1% of the record total program procurement cost.  
Meaning, less than 1% of the content difference was unaccounted for between the 
FY2007 PB (RDT&E and APN) and SAR December 2005.  The FY2008 PB successfully 



























Figure 9.   FY08 H-1 Upgrade Program SAR/PB Reconciliation 
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Recommendations provide by the task force to improve the reconciliation process 
were57: 
 
• DAMIR/SAR Deltas 
o Expand SAR Format “Track To Budget” to cover all PEs referenced to 
the Program 
o Expand SAR “Funding Annual Summary” Tables to include PB totals 
by PE per Fiscal Year 
• Perform SAR/PB Reconciliation In Fall 
o Use current PB submission to last SAR to obtain Program deltas 
o Findings show the big value SAR –PB disconnects are visible 
 
Figure 10 graphs all nine years side-by-side.  The APN data reported in FYs 2000 
and 2001 was taken from the RDT&E item justification report and the lack of initial 
spares data may account for the 2-3% content differences.  Data reported for FY2002 on 
June 2001 was incomplete for APN and cost accounting data and, therefore, could not be 











                                                 
57 Gary Bliss, “SAR to President’s Budget (PB) Reconciliation Task Force Update,” October 30 and 
31, 2007, slide 7, https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=180027&lang=en-US. 
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Nine-Year SAR and President's Budget Reconciliation
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
How have the H-1 Upgrade Program costs increases changed since the 2001-2002 
Nunn-McCurdy Breach? 
2. Secondary Questions 
a. What are the background and history of the H-1 helicopter and H-1 
Upgrade Program? 
b. How does recent acquisition reform of the Nunn-McCurdy Thresholds 
affected the H-1 Upgrade Program? 
c. How do the cost variance categories contribute independently and 
collectively to the overall program cost increases during the EMD/SDD 
Phase?  
d. Has the H-1 Upgrade Program cost increases stabilized? 
e. Do program Selected Acquisition Reported Data and the President’s 
Budgeted Data reconcile? 
 
The overview of the H-1 helicopter mission need, history, operational 
requirements, technical characteristics, contractual developments and adjustments 
provided the necessary background and historical record to satisfy question 2(a). 
Under the initial Nunn-McCurdy threshold regulations 15/25, it seemed that a 
program could re-baseline prior to reporting large cost increases, thus, aiding in the 
masking of true cost growth.  This ambiguity was tackled in the FY 2006 NDAA cost 
threshold adjustments.  The new cost thresholds broke down into two categories: one for 
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those programs that have re-baselined their initial estimates and another for those 
programs who continue to utilize their original baseline estimate.  The H-1 Program did 
have one critical breach and two significant increases but never re-baselined.  The 
program continues to utilize the 1996 base year cost estimates when calculating and 
reporting SAR data.   
At first glance, the cost increase experienced in December 2006 of 17.1 percent 
BY$ might raise a few eyebrows in the Congressional arena, but under the new 
thresholds the H-1 Upgrade Program does not require Congressional notification.  If the 
new thresholds 30/50 for original Baseline Estimates had been established in 2002, the 
upgrade program would not have had two additional significant threshold breaches after 
the critical breach in December 2001. 
Prior to the critical breach, the engineering cost variance accounted for more than 
72% of the total cost increases recorded by the program.  These changes represent the 
development of the system or items delivered.  Schedule cost variances that affect 
delivery, procurement, and milestones had no influence on cost increase.  The remaining 
28% of the average total cost increase split between the supporting requirements and 
estimations due to correction of error in preparation of the prior cost estimate.   Toward 
the end of 2000, supporting requirements began to account for a larger share of the two 
variances.  After the critical breach, more than 63% of the total cost increases were 
attributed to estimating changes.  Engineering and support variances attributed 
approximately 14 and 20 percent of the cost variances, respectively.  However, 
engineering cost variances percentages were lower after the breach they did not decrease 
and were only offset by the large estimation variance increase.  After the critical breach, 
scheduling cost variances began to have an effect on approximately 3% of the total costs.  
It is hard to believe that ‘Other’ cost increases due to the many natural disasters or 
unforeseeable events during the last 10 years, like the war in Iraqi, Hurricane Katrina and 
9/11, did not have an effected on the cost increases over the time.     
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B.  CLOSING  
In 1996, the H-1 Upgrade Program began its journey through the infamous DOD 
acquisition process.  Ten years later, the H-1 Program Manager stated that deliveries to 
government test squadrons would begin in November 2006 followed by training 
squadron insertion at HMT-303 in February 2007 and the first Fleet Marine Corps 
squadron detachment would begin training in January 2008 to meet the initial operational 
capability milestone by September 2008.58  As a Marine Corps Aircraft Maintenance 
Officer who’s career began in the H-1 arena, this writer can only preface all comments or 
opinions about the upgrade program as definitely bias; having experienced first hand the 
problems associated with aging airframes, the lack of supply support available, and the 
positive impact that these aircraft bring to any mission or rescue.  Based on the data, 
presented in the reports, by the PM and publically accessible, this program could have 
been managed better prior to December 2001, or at the very least, provided better cost 
estimates.  We are taught that bad news does not get sweeter with age, and therefore, if 
cost estimates had been shown to increase gradually, rather than the overnight increase, a 
Congressional review may not have been necessary.  Cost increases occur and not 
tracking these properly only compounds the issue.   The value this program brings to 
Navy and Marine Corps readiness and mission success is no doubt an underlining factor 
for having successfully acquired recertification in 2002.   
Over the past six years, the cost increases experienced by the H-1 Program have 
averaged 19 percent, well below the new 30/50 threshold requirements for programs of 
original Baseline Estimates.  The historical look at the Nunn-McCurdy inception, 
threshold modifications, affects of the threshold modifications on the cost breach of 2001 
and cost variance growths provided an insight to the overall cost improvements of H-1 
Program.  This project established program stability in cost increases within the System 
Development and Demonstration Phase of the Marine Corps H-1 Upgrade Program were 
stability means staying below the significant reporting threshold limit of 30% defined 
under the new threshold limitations.  One could make a valid argument that all our 
                                                 
58 Defense Daily (2006), “Navy Awards Bell $137 Million Contract For First Seven UH-1Y 
Helicopters,” Potomac: Jul 25, 2006.  Vol. 231, Issue 14,  p. 1. 
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defense programs should strive for cost increases closer to that of a national inflation rate; 
yet, programs do not perform in a single variable milieu.  The System Management 
Framework includes multiple variables from the environment (industry, congressional, 
public), inputs (socio-economic, resources, end-users), conversions (JCIDS, PPBE, 
FAR), output (weapon, security, and defense) and feedback (GAO, IG, reform).  Each of 
these variables can effect the cost of a program independently and as a group they begin 
to increase the overall cost potential of a program linearly or even exponentially.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Over the course of this project a few areas of additional research surfaced that 
could either effect the overall conclusions of program stability or provide additional 
support and validate the necessity for the threshold changes. 
• A comparative analysis into the H-1 Upgrade Program’s schedule delays 
and performance to the cost overruns would provide a more complete 
picture of the programs overall stability.  Analysis of each area is 
beneficial in ferreting out selective trouble spots; to understand overall 
program improvement cost, schedule and performance could collective tell 
a different story of success or failure. 
• In addition, investigation into how the new thresholds affected programs 
that have re-baselined and/or had quantity adjustments are additional areas 
of interest that surfaced during this project. 
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